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Successful operation of an exchange economy depends on mutual trust and the use 
of norms – explicit and implicit. When these behavioural modes are plentiful, it is 
easy to overlook their role. But when they have to be cultivated, that lacuna can be 
a major barrier to economic success (Sen 1999: 263)
This paper examines the relationship between trust and economic growth. With 
the help of panel data I conclude that economic growth is negatively related to an 
increase in trust. My result is contrary to works taking a cross section design in 
which trust is positively related to growth.  The relationship is tested in the  
context of EU countries, OECD countries, transition countries and developing 
countries. Interpersonal trust and systemic trust is differentiated. 
In recent years it has become popular in economic science to discuss the relationship 
between social capital and economic growth. Social Capital is said to be “the glue 
that holds societies together” and it is emphasized that “without it no economic 
growth or human well-being” is possible (Serageldin 1999: iii). Although I agree 
that it is important to broaden the neo-classical growth model (Solow 1956) - which 
normally includes the factors of labour, physical capital and lately human capital 
(Barro 1991, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) - by 
the factor social capital (Dasgupta 1999, Serageldin 1999, Serageldin and Grootaert 
1999, Whiteley 2000), the term social capital has to be discussed carefully in the 
first instance, as it has a considerable number of different definitions. In the 
following paper I firstly pay close attention to those definitions which are relevant 
for the relationship between social capital and economic growth, and focus on the 
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1dimension of trust within the paradigm of social capital. Recent empirical research 
shows that there is a positive relation between interpersonal trust and economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer 1997, La Porta et al. 1999, Whiteley 2000, Zak and 
Knack 2001, Beugelsdijk et al. 2004). 
In contrast to existing works which examine the relationship between social capital 
and economic growth using a cross-section research design, I use a panel research 
design. This was first done in a paper by Roth and Schüler (2006)
3. This paper 
differs from the earlier version in that it uses a newly constructed and expanded data 
set using more observations (countries and points in time) and in that it focuses on 
the main empirical results.  I investigate whether there is a different pattern for 
OECD, EU15, transition and developing nations and argue that it is important to 
differentiate these kind of country samples. Furthermore I aim to differentiate 
between interpersonal and systemic trust. 
I. Theoretical links between Trust, Social Capital and Economic 
Growth
1. Social Capital and Trust 
Many economists focus on trust when talking about social capital (Knack and 
Keefer 1997, Solow 1999, Whiteley 2000). Tonkiss (2000: 78) comments that trust 
regularly features – together with norms and networks – within definitions of social 
capital. But how is trust related to social capital? Let us firstly look at the classic 
definitions of social capital by James Coleman and Robert Putnam.
Coleman (1988, 1990), similarly to Pierre Bourdieu (1983), defines social 
capital as those resources of social structure which are utilized by individual actors 
and facilitate certain actions of the actor. In contrast to other forms of capital, such 
as physical and human capital, social capital is embedded in the relationships 
between two or more actors. Although mentioning three forms of relationships 
which   contain   social   capital
4  (1988:101   ff.),   Coleman   tends   to   identify   the 
3 Roth and Schüler (2006) is available on request.  
4 These are the following three: i) Obligations, expectations and trustworthiness of structures, ii) 
information channels and iii) norms and sanction.
2trustworthiness of the social environment as the most important form of social 
capital (Coleman 1990 in Whiteley 2000: 448). 
Building upon Coleman’s works, the American political scientist Robert 
Putnam, studying the regions of Italy, comes to the conclusion that: “(…) norms and 
networks have fostered economic growth, not inhibited it” (Putnam 1993: 176). He 
defines social capital as ”features of social organizations, such as trust, norms and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
action” (167). Putnam stresses that the indicators “networks” and “norms” function 
as a prerequisite of trust (177), thus trust appears an outcome of norms and 
networks. 
This definition mixes psychological (trust and norms) and behaviouristic 
(networks) indicators. Kenneth Newton doubts that it is wise to combine all three 
dimensions. He suggests that from an empirical point of view the concepts should be 
separated into their components and tested empirically (1997: 584). I agree with 
Newton that it is important to separate the dimensions of social capital into its 
components   trust,   norms   and   networks   for   two   reasons.  By  hypothetically 
combining   all   three  indicators   into   an   index   we   face   the   problem   of 
multicollinearity
5 and the weighting
6 of the different indicators becomes unclear. 
In the following paper I therefore want to focus on the dimension of trust 
within the concept of social capital. I leave it open as to whether social capital can 
be reduced to trust only, or if other dimensions like social networks are essential for 
a satisfactory operationalisation  of  social capital. For further research in the field of 
social capital a strict division of the indicators of social capital is necessary to 
develop a closer look at the mechanisms of how each indicator works empirically. 
This research approach helps to minimize the danger of overstretching the paradigm 
of social capital. 
5 Multicollinearity is usually regarded as a problem because it means that the regression coefficients 
may be unstable. This implies that they are likely to be subject to considerable variability from 
sample to sample (Bryman and Cramer 2005: 302). When we add a new x variable that is strongly 
related to x variables in the model, symptoms of possible trouble include the following i) 
Substantially higher standard errors, with correspondingly lower t statistics, ii) Unexpected changes 
in coefficient magnitudes or signs, iii) nonsignificant coefficients despite a high R
2 (Hamilton 2003: 
166).
6 Usually one has to weigh the indicators forming and index due to theoretical reasons. 
32. Definitions of Trust
Fukuyama defines trust as the “expectation that arises within a community of 
regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms” 
(Fukuyama 1995: 26 in Tonkiss 2000: 79). Luhmann defines trust as an elementary 
fact of social life (2000:1) and determines the problem of trust as a risky input 
(Luhmann 2000: 27). Dasgupta defines trust as ”the expectation of one person about 
the action of others that affect the person's choice, when an action of others are 
known” (Dasgupta 1997:5 in Ostrom 1998: 12). 
Although there is a variety of definitions of trust recent literature distinguishes 
between   three   forms   of   trust.   Authors   distinguish   between   interpersonal   or 
generalized trust, thick trust, and systemic or institutional trust (Putnam 2000: 137, 
Newton 1997: 578 ff., Luhmann 2000). Newton (1997) and Williams (1988) classify 
trust which is generated by family networks as thick trust. Thick trust is mostly 
measured by asking whether the person trusts her own family members. This 
question is asked for example in the second wave of the World Value Survey (1990-
1993). In contrast, generalized trust is defined as trust which is generated by looser, 
secondary relations in modern societies, based on everyday interaction between 
people who do not otherwise know each other. Generalized trust is measured by 
asking   whether   people   in   general   can   be   trusted.   Most   scientists   focus   on 
interpersonal trust when examining the relationship between economic growth and 
trust, as it is supposed to facilitate cooperation and lower transaction costs in 
economic systems. Economic systems tend to be characterized by a substantial 
degree of differentiation, and exchange activity frequently depends upon trust in 
strangers. The common survey item seeking to measure interpersonal trust asks 
respondents whether “people can be trusted in general or whether you can’t be too 
careful when dealing with people”. This item, which is used in several international 
surveys
7, is used in this paper when I talk about trust. Like many other authors doing 
research on trust I therefore focus on interpersonal trust. 
Thirdly, systemic or institutional trust refers to the confidence people have in certain 
institutions. In talking about systemic trust I focus on trust in the parliament, trust in 
the police, armed forces and big companies.
7 For example the WVS, ESS, ISSP and Eurobarometer.
43. Positive Relationship between Trust and Economic Growth
Arrow argues that the presence of virtues such as trust plays a significant role in the 
operation of economic systems (1972: 345).  He builds his assumption upon the 
paradigm of exchange and elaborates that the process of exchange requires or is 
greatly facilitated by virtues, as for instance trust (345). For Fukuyama trust is an 
essential factor in economic outcomes. A nation’s well-being and its ability to 
compete depend upon the level of trust inherent in a society (1995:7). In line with 
the argument Sen argues that “the development and use of trust in one another’s 
words and promises can be a very important ingredient of market success” (Sen 
1999: 262) and that “no society would be viable without some norms and rules of 
conduct” (Sen 1977: 332).
All authors argue for a positive relationship between trust and economic benefit. But 
how is trust related to economic growth? 
Accordingly to Whiteley (2000: 451), interpersonal trust has three direct channels 
through which it might stimulate economic growth and three indirect channels. Trust 
has a direct effect on economic performance through reducing transaction costs. 
Transaction costs theoretically evolve during the economic process of exchange and 
specialization and are defined as costs associated with banking, insurance, finance, 
wholesale, and retail trade or in terms of dealing with lawyers and accountants etc. 
(North 1990: 28).  
Secondly, trust has direct influence on growth because it enables actors to 
solve collective action problems (451). This argument is among others similar to 
Putnam’s analysis (1995: 76), which puts forward four arguments why social 
capital, including interpersonal trust, has a positive effect on the economy: i) it 
facilitates coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit, ii) it solves dilemmas of 
collective action, iii) it reduces the incentives for opportunism, iv) it reduces egoism. 
These arguments are in line with Hradin (1982) and Ostrom (1990). In high trust 
societies it should theoretically be easier to cope with free rider problems (Whiteley 
2000: 451, Hardin 1982: 9, Ostrom 1990: 3). 
The third direct effect is that principal-agent problems might be much less 
significant in high trust societies (North 1990. 32-33). According to Knack and 
Keefer (1997) two arguments can be mentioned in this context: i) If entrepreneurs 
5devote more time to monitoring possible malfeasance by partners, employees and 
suppliers they will have less time to devote to innovation in new products or 
processes;  ii) Employment contracts in which managers rely on employees to 
accomplish tasks can be difficult to monitor. 
Moreover trust works indirectly via interactions with i) human capital, ii) 
physical investment and iii) convergence, all of which are known to make a 
contribution to economic growth. It can be argued that i) in high trust societies the 
returns to educational investments are higher, ii) high-trust societies are less risk-
averse which creates greater incentives to invest in physical and human capital and 
iii) the diffusion of innovation and new technologies will be faster in high-trust 
societies.
Alongside interpersonal trust I might consider institutional trust, the trust we 
have in institutions (Luhmann 2000). 
But must trust always be positively related to economic growth or are there 
theoretical arguments for a negative relationship between trust and economic 
growth? I now turn to theoretical arguments that imply a negative relationship 
between interpersonal trust and growth.
4. Negative Relationship between Trust and Economic Growth  
It has been argued up to now that trust and therefore the facilitation of collective 
action leads to economic development and growth. But is this necessarily or always 
the case?
One starting-point for a negative relationship between trust and economic 
growth is in the literature on collective action by Mancur Olson (1982). I have to 
acknowledge that this literature deals with the dimension of networks rather than the 
dimension of trust but I find the discussion quite fruitful and for my argumentation 
appropriate. Olson identifies the logic of collective action in quite a contrary way. 
Collective action can undermine the state’s power to implement necessary reforms 
or agendas to maintain high economic growth rates (Olson 1982).  To give one 
example, if a state wants to implement a labour market reform, in which for example 
employee rights are reduced, a sector with cheap labour is implemented, working 
6hours are extended, social spending on unemployment benefit and support is 
decreased to reduce the costs of the factor labour, a high trusting and solidaristic 
society may more easily oppose the state’s efforts for reforms and will, via the 
mobilization of collective action, stop the reform agenda and therefore limit the 
potential of higher economic growth rates.  This argument is build upon the 
empirical findings that a vibrant civil society is crucial for high levels of trust 
(Putnam 1993, 1995). In fact it could be actors within civil society, such as church 
groups, professional groups and Social Movements Organizations (SMOs) that 
oppose the state’s will to implement reforms. Similarly the number of workers being 
member of labour unions may be a critical factor for the existence of high levels of 
trust (Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000). 
The second explanation could be that, rather than trust, fear is a key explanatory 
variable for economic growth. A society with high levels of fear will not as easily 
oppose to processes of reformation of the economy. These processes of reformation 
on the other hand are crucial for economic prosperity, especially in the advanced 
economies of the OECD. The government will meet less opposition if the society is 
weak and governmental policies can be implemented faster and without opposition. 
Let us consider an example from organizational theory. It can be part of a company's 
strategy to create an atmosphere of fear between its employees. This non-solidaristic 
working atmosphere mobilizes the employees to monitor themselves, work harder 
and raise the overall productivity of the company. Another example for the positive 
relationship   between   fear   and   economic   growth   is   the   following.   A   high 
unemployment rate in a country is most often interlinked with the fear of loosing 
one's job. Employees who are afraid of loosing their job work harder, take less legal 
employment rights into consideration, are less sick, are overall less demanding. This 
fear also has implications for the action of trade unions. The employers association 
have more power to push trough wage reduction and the extension of the working 
hours if the trade unions give top priority to the preservation of jobs. The extension 
of working hours has a direct positive effect on economic growth.
Thirdly one could argue that it is the welfare state effort that is responsible for a 
negative relationship between interpersonal trust and economic growth. If the 
welfare state creates high levels of interpersonal trust and is negatively affecting 
economic growth (see Atkinson 1999 for a detailed discussion of the relationship 
7between the welfare state and economic growth) an increase of welfare state activity 
would go hand in hand with an increase of levels of interpersonal trust and a 
decrease of economic growth. For the author it seems absolutely necessary to further 
clarify   the   relationship   between   welfare   state   effort,   interpersonal   trust   and 
economic growth (See Roth forthcoming).
Fourthly  the   degree   of   social   inequality   could   affect   the   two   paradigms 
interpersonal trust and economic growth. On the one hand, taking the empirical 
results from Forbes (2000) for granted, an increase of social inequality is related to 
an increase of economic growth. On the other hand an increase of social inequality 
seems to be strongly related to a decrease of interpersonal trust (see Knack and 
Keefer 1997, Zak and Knack 2001, Knack and Zak 2002 and Rothstein and Uslaner 
2005)
5. Economic Development and Social Capital 
Analytically it is important to distinguish between developed and developing 
countries. This view on differentiating developed from developing countries can be 
traced back to the work of Arrow. For him “It can be plausibly argued that much of 
the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual 
confidence” (Arrow 1972: 357 in Knack and Keefer 1997: 1252). Mutual confidence 
in this sense is interpreted as mutual confidence in strangers. In the line of the 
arguments Sen (1999: 264) stresses that trust is especially important in less-
developed societies with fewer formal institutions. The formal institutions in 
developed countries mean interpersonal trust may not be as critical, as they 
guarantee the necessary cooperation without the necessity of interpersonal trust. 
Similarly Woolcock, in referring to the differences of developed and developing 
nations, posits interpersonal trust as a basic explanation for the economic differences 
(1998: 153). In accordance with the argument Durlauf and Fafchamps mention that 
interpersonal trust is especially important for developing countries “where many 
transactions are small and buyers and sellers are too poor for court action to yield 
reparation” (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005: 1650).
8II. Findings on trust and economic growth
Using a cross-sectional OLS regression of 29 market economies, Knack and 
Keefer (1997) find that interpersonal trust has a positive influence on economic 
growth (1980-1992) and investment. They draw their data from the first and second 
wave of the world value survey 1981-84 and 1990-93, using an economic growth 
model which includes initial GDP, primary education, secondary education, the 
price level of investment and interpersonal trust. 
Building on their work, Zak and Knack (2001), using an OLS regression on 
41 market economies, find a positive coefficient of trust on economic growth. They 
replicate the growth model in the paper of Knack and Keefer. To enlarge their 
country sample they mix data from the three waves of the World Value Survey 
(1981-84, 1990-91 and 1995-97), the Eurobarometer and a government-sponsored 
survey for the case of New Zealand. Dependent variables are again investment as a 
percentage of GDP and annual growth of per capita income. This time they 
investigate the time period from 1970-92.
Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) analyze the robustness of the results of Knack and 
Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) along four dimensions of robustness. They 
first concentrate on the statistical significance. Secondly they explore the influence 
of changing sets of conditioning variables on the estimated effect of trust. Thirdly 
they analyze the sensitivity of the results for using different proxies or specifications 
for basic variables like human capital. Finally they investigate the effects on the 
significance and effect size when the 29 country sample by Knack and Keefer is 
extended by 12 in the Zak and Knack Paper. The authors come to the conclusion, 
that “(…) their extensive robustness analysis further adds to the empirical evidence 
that trust matters for explaining variation in economic performance” (132).
Berggren, Elinder and Jordahl (2007) conduct an extensive robustness 
analysis of the relationship between trust and growth by investigating a latter time 
period and a bigger sample size. The authors work with 63 countries using data on 
trust   from   the   fourth   wave   of   the   World   Value   Survey   and   from   the 
Latinobarometro, as well as new data on growth to separate time and sample effects.
They investigate whether previous results on the trust-growth relationship for the 
period 1970-1992, studied by Zak and Knack and Beugelsdijk et al., holds also for 
9the 1990s. They find out that when outliers are removed (here they mention 
especially  China)   the  trust-growth  relationship   is   only  statistically  significant 
(Significance at the 95 percent level) in ten percent of their 1.140 regressions, and is 
as half as large, compared to the results that have been reported before. The authors 
emphasize however that their results do “not necessarily mean that trust is 
unimportant for growth, but its important seems to be limited and uncertain than 
previously claimed” (1). 
La Porta and others (1999) using an OLS regression on 39 countries and a 
cross-section design with a dependent variable Growth of GDP per capita from 
1970-1993 find a positive relationship between trust and economic growth. They 
come to the conclusion that “in sum trust enhances economic performances across 
countries” (317) and that“(...) theories of trust hold up remarkably well when tested 
on a cross-section of countries” (320).
Whiteley (2000) examines the relationship between trust and economic 
growth in the framework of a modified neo-classical model of economic growth. 
Using a cross-section design in a 34 country sample, taking the growth rate of GDP 
per capita from 1970-1992 as the dependent variable, he comes to the conclusion 
that an index of three trust indicators from the World Value Survey 1990-93 has a 
positive effect on economic growth, with an impact as great as the variable human 
capital and conditional convergence. His findings support the idea that “values play 
a key role in explaining cross-national variations in economic performance and that 
they cannot be ignored in any properly specified model of economic growth” (460). 
In contrast to these findings Heliwell (1996), taking an OECD country 
sample (17 OECD countries), found a negative relationship between trust and 
productivity growth from 1960-1992 (Associations and social capital, an equally 
weighted combination between trust and associations, are also negatively related to 
productivity growth). His results seem to be the only cross-country indication of a 
negative effect between trust and economic performance. 
These empirical studies involve a critical and important step in focusing on the 
concept of trust when reflecting upon economic growth. Their cross-section designs 
support the hypothesis that trust matters for economic growth (cf. Heliwell 1996). 
They all nevertheless neglect to examine how changes in trust affect economic 
growth. For policy decision making, however, it might be more relevant to analyse 
10the effect of changes in trust on economic performance by using a fixed-effects 
model. Furthermore using a fixed-effects model does give me two advantages. 
Firstly I am able to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Secondly, I am able to 
tackle the problem that the interpretation of my trust items differ across countries.
III. Data and Measurement
1. Operationalization
The World Value Survey has only limited data on trust. The trust variable is 
constructed, as it is usually agreed upon by scholars from various disciplines 
(Inglehart 1990 and 1999, Knack and Keefer 1997, Paxton 1999 and 2002, Uslaner 
1999, Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, Putnam 2000, Whiteley 2000, Zak and Knack 
2001, van Oorschot and Arts 2005, Delhey and Newton 2005), by aggregating the 
answer Most people can be trusted
8 (after deleting the “Don't know” answers) to the 
item “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people” (WVS1999-2002)
9 . I am thereby 
able to compare the stock of trust in different nations from developed, to non-
developed, to transition states. The stock of trust varies from 2.6 percent in Brazil 
(26 out of 1000 respondents answered “Most people can be trusted” (WVS 1995-
1997) to 66.5 percent (665 out of 1000 respondents answered “Most people can be 
trusted”  in   Denmark   (WVS   1999-2002).   There   are   various   critiques   of   this 
operationalization
10. 
8In the Eurobaromter 25 the answer is “Most people could be trusted”.
9The ending of the question is slightly different in the first three waves of the WVS and the 
Eurobarometer 25: “(...) cant be too careful in dealing with people” (WVS 1981-84, WVS 1990-93, 
WVS 1995-97) and “(...) could not be too careful in dealing with people” (Eurobarometer 25).
10This   approach   is   criticized   by   referring   to   the   non-comparability   of   the   different   cultural 
backgrounds of the countries that participate in the World Value Survey. Researchers question 
whether data from China can be compared to data from Germany when the etymological meaning of 
the term trust differs in the languages. Although correct these criticism has to be neglected when 
comparing different cultures, in so far as intercultural comparison would be made impossible. I 
therefore have to be pragmatic in using the data which is available. Furthermore recent research 
provides evidence that individuals from the different countries did interpret the question from the 
WVS in similar ways (Paxton 2002: 261) and that the trust data is valid and of high quality as it 
correlates highly with a natural experiments done by the readers digest (Knack and Keefer 1997: 
1257). Glaeser (2000) doubts that the item measures trusting behaviour, but the overall level of 
trustworthiness in a society. Jagodzinski and Manabe (2005) state that the item is not measuring trust 
112. Model Specification 
To be able to compare my results with previous empirical work conducted on the 
relationship between trust and economic growth I use a version of the economic 
growth   model   used   by   Knack   and   Keefer   (1997),   Zak   and   Knack   (2001), 
Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) and Berggren et al. (2007). Furthermore a version of this 
kind of growth model was used by Forbes (2000) when analysing the relationship 
between inequality and economic growth in a panel setting from 1965-1995.
In my baseline model, economic growth is estimated as a function of the natural 
logarithm of income, the price level of investment
11, human capital, interpersonal 
and systemic trust
12. I estimate an unbalanced panel. The baseline growth model for 
my fixed-effects estimation is modelled as follows :   
Growth  i,t =  β1 Trust i,t-1 
+ β2 Income i,t-1 
+ β3  Human Capital i,t-1 
+ β4 PPPI i,t-1 +  αi 
 + wi,t,
where i represents each country and t represents each time period (with t = 1-5); 
Growth it is the average annual growth for country i at period t; Trust i,t-1, Income i,t-1, 
Human Capital i,t-1,PPPI i,t-1, and are respectively trust, income, human capital and 
but misanthropy, and it was taken as an index of misanthropy by Rosenberg. Sobel, Portes and 
Durlauf and Fafchamps criticize the method of aggregation. For them social trust should better be 
measured on a micro- and meso-level (Sobel 2002: 151, Portes 2000: 4 ff., Durlauf and Fafchamps 
2005). Furthermore Knowles (2005), argues that there are problems with the coverage and the sample 
representativeness of each nation (16). Inglehart (Coodbook in Inglehart 2000) points out that data in 
developing countries are not fully representative for the whole country. People living in cities and the 
better-educated are over-sampled. Even when adjusting the data through weighting these groups are 
still over-represented.
11This variable is frequently utilized in macroeconomic and international literature and measures how 
the cost of investment varies between each country and the United States. It is meant to capture 
market distortion that affect the cost of investment, such as tariffs, government regulations, 
corruption, and the cost of foreign exchange (Forbes 2000: 873). For further description see Barro 
(1991: 433).
12 Factors other than social capital examined in this context include the rule of law, democracy, ethnic 
fractionalization, gender inequality, fertility rate, government consumption ratio, the terms of trade, 
inflation rate, indicators of political stability, etc. (Barro 1991, Klasen 2002, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
2004). 
12price level of investment for country  i  during period  t-1;  αi  represents a group 
specific constant term and w i,t is the error term.
3. Measurement of data
Data on incomes and growth are based on per capita incomes between 1980 and 
2004 adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP, expressed in constant 2000 U.S. 
Dollars) drawn from the World Development Indicator Database 2006. Since yearly 
growth rates incorporate short-run disturbances, growth is averaged over five-year 
periods. My dependant variable is an average growth rate per capita for the periods 
1980 - 1984, 1985 - 1989, 1990 - 1994, 1995 - 1999 and 2000 - 2004. 
• The data on price level of investment, population growth as a proxy for the 
factor Labour, the investment share of GDP at constant prices and Openness 
at constant prices is drawn from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston et al. 
2002)
13. The variables were constructed  by using lagged variables (1979, 
1984,  1989, 1994  and  1999) in  order  to control  for the problem  of 
endogeneity.
• The data on interpersonal trust and systemic trust is drawn from four waves 





13 The Penn World Table provides key economic data for 168 countries for some or all of the years 
1950-2000. It can be downloaded at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu.
14 The World Value Survey series is designed to enable a cross national comparison of values and 
norms on a variety of topics and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe. A full 
description is given under http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/services/index.html.
15The data for Argentina was taken from 1984. The data for the US, Sweden, South Korea, South 
Africa, Norway and Hungary were taken from 1982. The data can be ordered from the ICPSR 
(Inglehart 2000).The data was weighted by using original weight (v236). As no researcher, I am 
aware of, ever mentioned if taking weights I computed the values for the first wave of the WVS 
(1981-84) with and without weights. When taking no weights the USA would have an interpersonal 
trust value of 40.5 instead of 45,4 as reported in Knack and Keefer (1997: 1284). For a better 
comparison of my results I figured to take weights. Furthermore the codebook for the dataset 
mentions to use the weight variable as it corrects the sample to reflect national distributions of key 
variables (Codebook: 52 in Inglehart 2000).  In contrast Delhey and Newton compute most of their 
interpersonal trust without taking weights (2005: 315)
16The data for Romania was taken from 1993. The data for Slovenia was taken from 1992. The data 
for Argentina and Brazil were taken from 1991. The trust data was weighted by using original weight 
(v236). The data can be ordered from the ICPSR (Inglehart 2000).
17The data for Britain was taken from 1998. The data for Brazil, Bulgaria, Poland and West-Germany 
were taken from 1997. The data for Bangladesh, Chile, Finland, Norway, Philippines,  South Africa, 
South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela were taken from 1996. The data was 
weighted by using original weight (v236). The data can be ordered from the ICPSR (Inglehart 
2000).The sample for Japan, Finland and South Africa were, when taking the weight variable v236, 
changed significantly in proportion. In Japan the sample was 20 times smaller, in Finland 100 times 
bigger and in South Africa around 9 times bigger. The values for Japan without taking the weighting 
operation is 42.3 instead of 46, for Finland 48,8 instead of 47.6 and for South Africa  15,9 instead of 
13and 1999-2002
18 and the Eurobarometer 25
19 providing me with Data from 
the year 1986. 
• The data on human capital are based on Barro and Lee (2000) and refer to 
the total years of schooling of the Total Population Aged 25 and Over
20. Data 
was taken from 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000
• Data on welfare effort are based on the size of spending of the welfare state, 
typically expressed  as a proportion of gross domestic product as in the 
OECD statistics for social security transfers (OECD 2004)
21.  
• Data on income inequality are based on the UN–database WIDER. Only data 
from the Luxenbourg Income Study (LIS) is taken. 
 
 
18.2. However, as the sample size is proportional to each other, I took, for better cross-country 
comparison, values which were weighted by v236. Anyhow, differences in the values do not 
influence econometric results. In most cases the Don`t know answers had to be deleted. 
18The data for Bangladesh was taken from 2002. The data with the study number 3975 can be ordered 
from the ICPSR (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2004). The 
data was weighted by taking the variable s017.
19The trust data was weighted by using European Weights. The data can be ordered from the 
Zentralarchiv (ZA) in Cologne (Rabier, Jacques-Rene; Riffault, Helene and Ronald Inglehart 1988).
20The data can be drawn from http://www.cid.harvard.edu.
21Those statistics are available over the internet from http:www.oecd.org/statistics. The social 
expenditure data is given for a range of 30 OECD countries. 
14IV. Descriptive Statistics
My sample consists of 41 countries. 27 out of 30 OECD
22 countries and 14 out of 15 
EU15
23 countries are included. Table 1 lists all interpersonal trust values for the 
included country observations in my dataset.
Figure 1 shows the changes of trust from 1990 to 1995 for the countries for which 
the data was available for both periods. 
 Figure 1
Changes of Trust from 1990 - 1995
In contrast to the agreement that interpersonal trust is a constant variable, formed by 
the cultural background of a nation (Knack and Keefer 1997, Zak and Knack 2001, 
Knowles 2005, Delhey and Newton 2005: 314, c.f. Inglehart 1997: 224, Inglehart 
1999: 95, Noelle 2005: 5), the Figure shows that there is a strong decline in trust 
22 I included 27 out of 30 OECD countries. The countries which are included are Austria, Australia, 
Belgium,  Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Iceland, 
Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Spain, Sweden, South-Korea, Switzerland, 
Slovak Republic, Turkey, United Kingdom, USA. Luxembourg, New Zealand and Czech Republic 
had to be excluded due to data restrictions.
23 I included 14 out 15 EU 15 countries. The countries which are included are Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 



















































































































































































Levels of Interpersonal Trust
Country     Trust 81       Trust 86*       Trust 90        Trust 95        Trust 99
USA 45,4 - 50 35,6 35,8
Japan 40,8 - 41,7 46 43,1
Germany 29,8 43,4 37,8 41,8 34,8**
France 24,8 21,3 22,8 - 22,2
Italy 26,3 30,3 35,3 - 32,6
Britain 44,4 39,7 43,6 31 29,7
Canada 49,6 - 52,4 - 38,8
Australia 47,8 - - 39,9 -
Austria - - 31,8 - 33,9
Belgium 30,2 29,5 33,2 - 30,7
Denmark 56 63,5 57,7 - 66,5
Finland 57,2 - 62,7 47,6 58
Greece - 50 - - 23,7
Iceland 41,6 - 43,6 - 41,1
Ireland 40,2 33,3 47,4 - 35,2
South Korea 38 - 34,2 30,3 27,3
Mexico 17,7 - 33,5 28 21,3
Netherlands 46,2 50,2 55,8 - 59,8
Norway 61,2 - 65,1 65,3 -
Portugal - 28,4 21,4 - 10
Spain  34,5 35,3 33,8 29,7 36,2
Sweden 57,1 - 66,1 59,7 66,3
Switzerland - - 43,2 40,9 -
Turkey - - 10 6,5 15,7
Slovak Rep. - - 23 - 15,7
Hungary 33,1 - 24,6 - 21,8
Poland - - 34,5 17,9 18,9
Slovenia - - - 15,5 21,7
Bulgaria - - - 28,6 26,9
Romania - - 16,1 - 10,1
China - - 60,1 52,3 54,5
India - - 34,3 37,9 41
Argentina 27 - 23,3 17,5 15,4
Brazil - - 6,7 2,8 -
Chile - - 22,7 21,9 22,8
Peru - - - 5,0 10,7
Venezuela - - - 13,7 15,9
S. Africa 29 - 28,3 18,2 11,8
Bangladesh - - - 20,9 23,5
Pakistan - - - 20,6 30,8
Philippines - - - 5,5 8,4
Observations 22 11 32 27 37
Average 39,9 38,6 37,4 28,9 30,1
Note:  *The trust data from 1986 is taken from the Eurobarometer 25. **Trust Data from Germany were 
taken from West-Germany in 1981, 1986, 1990 and 1995. The Data from 1999 was taken from unified Germany.
16between the 1990 and 1995 time period
24. Only Germany, Japan and India have 
increased their level of trust. On the other end of the scale the two liberal economies 
the United Kingdom and the United States face a severe decline. The United States 
looses 14,4 percent of interpersonal trust, the United Kingdom 12,2 percent. Poland 
and Finland face the severest losses. Poland looses 16,6 percent, Finland 15,1, South 
Africa looses 10,1, China looses 7,8 and Sweden looses 6,4 percent. Argentina and 
Mexico loose around 5 percent. Only Chile and Norway behave stably. 
Figure 2
Scatter Plot between Δ Trust [1995-1990] and Δ Growth [9599-9094]
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the changes of trust in the period  [1995-
1990] and the changes of growth in the period [9599-9094] for all countries 
(“Before and After” Comparison). The change in the trust level of the USA of -14,4 
24Although trust values intercorrelate strongly (comparing every combination of two waves I get 
values from 0.75 to 0.93) there are still very important changes over time. If the wealthiest nation of 
the world, the United States, and the United Kingdom loose nearly one third of their original trust 
level, trust cannot be treated as a constant variable. These changes of trust have to be highlighted and 
have to be examined. Taking the case of Germany for instance clarifies that over the timespan from 
1950 to 2005 there is steady increase of the level of interpersonal trust in Germany (Noelle 2005).  To 
stress on the US case once more: Inglehart and Uslaner show that there is a decline in interpersonal 
trust from 58 percent in 1960 to 36 percent in 1994 (Inglehart: 1999: 95, Uslaner 1999: 132).
17percent is associated with a change in the annual growth for that period of 1,2 
percent. In the USA a decline in trust went hand in hand with a rise in annual 
growth. In the United Kingdom we get the same picture. The change in the trust 
level of -12,2 percent is associated with a change in the annual growth rate of 2.08 
percent. The Scandinavian countries Finland and Sweden support the findings on the 
USA and the United Kingdom. The decline in trust of -15,1 and -6,4 percentage 
points go hand in hand with an increase of the growth rate of 5.8 and 2.9 percentage
points. The transition countries Poland and Bulgaria behave in the same manner. In 
Poland the decline in trust of 16,6 is related to increase of 5,2 percent of annual 
growth. This relationship changes when observing Argentina and India. In Argentina 
a decline in the level of trust of -5,8 goes hand in hand with a decline in the annual 
growth rate of -4,3 percent. In India an increase of the level of trust of 3,4 percent is 
followed by an increase of the annual growth rate of 1,7. In the cases of Argentina 
and India, there seems to be a positive relationship between trust and economic 
growth. Taking all countries into consideration I get a weak negative relationship 
between delta Trust and delta Growth with an R-Square value 0,173. Considering 




Variable Year Observations Mean deviation Minimum        Maximum
Growth 1980 22 1.6 1.6 -1.64 6.65
1985 11 3.0 1.3 1.17 5.12
1990 32 1.13 3.21 -5.07 11.38
1995 27 2.15 2.1 -2.24 7.52
2000 37 2.29 2.04 -0.58 8.37
Interpersonal 1980 22 39.9 12 17.7 61.2
Trust 1985 11 38.6 12.3 21.3 63.5
1990 32 37.4 15.8 6.7 66.1
1995 27 28.9 16.7 2.8 65.3
2000 37 30.1 15.7 8.4 66.5
Income   1980 22 9.62 0.38 8.49 10.03
1985 11 9.73 0.23 9.32 10.03
1990 32 9.50 0.76 7.38 10.33
1995 27 9.15 0.92 7.19 10.31
2000 37 9.45 0.87 7.3 10.43
Human Capital 1980 22 7.80 1.85 4.49 11.91
1985 11 7.28 1.76 3.57 9.42
1990 32 7.94 2.20 3.68 12
1995 27 7.76 2.74 2.32 12.18
2000 37 8.14 2.27 2.45 12.25
Price level of 1980 22 101.4 24.6 58.6 143.2
investment 1985 11 62.6 8.13 47.5 73.9
1990 32 82.5 24.7 39.8 128.5
1995 27 75.6 31.3 29.6 154.5
2000 37 75.3 27.0 31.97 126.8
Openness  1980 22 43.7 23.6 10.98 103.11
 1985 11 51.8 26.8 24.8 104.2
 1990 32 48.3 26.4 10.45 117.55
 1995 27 47.2 24.4 14.13 110.16
 2000 37 72.4 36.9 19.4 176.7
Investment 1980 22 23.63 4.56 13.82 34.16
1985 11 20.31 2.19 15.86 23.18
1990 32 22.1 6.13 9.24 36.5
1995 27 19.4 6.95 7.64 40.71
2000 37 21.0 5.80 7.03 30.04
Systemic Trust -  1980 22 2.51 0.31 2.09 3.45
Parliament 1985   - -   -   -   -
1990 31 2.38 0.33 1.8 3.18
1995 24 2.05 0.32 1.4 2.68
2000 37 2.3 0.35 1.7 3.34
19V. Econometric Analysis
First of all, using a cross-section design, I estimate an OLS-model
  with robust 
estimators of standard errors for my dataset
25. For my dependent variable I use the 
growth rate of GDP per capita for the 15 year period from 1990–2004. My country 
sample consists of 32 countries due to data limitations from my interpersonal trust 
value in the 1990`s. Regression 1 in Table 3 shows that all variables have the 
expected signs except the human capital variable. I get a negative significant 
coefficient for my income variable (conditional convergence), I get a negative 
significant coefficient for my variable price level of investment and I replicate the 
positive significant relationship between interpersonal trust and economic growth. 
This result is in accordance with most empirical findings using a cross-section 
design and taking interpersonal trust data from the 1990`s  (Knack and Keefer 1997, 
Zak and Knack 2001, La Porta et al. 1999).
Secondly, I estimate the model using a pooled panel analysis. A pooled panel 
analysis is similar to the method of a standard ordinary least square estimation, but 
in order to get more reliable estimates of the parameters, a pooled panel estimation 
widens the database by pooling the time series of the country sample. Hence my 
pooled panel consists of 129 observations with 41 individual cases. Using a pooled 
panel regression and examining all 129 observations Regression 2 in Table 3 
replicates my result from the cross-section design and the results of most empirical 
research. I get a significant positive coefficient for my trust variable. However my 
proxy  for   human   capital   “average   years   of   schooling”   shows   no  significant 
relationship with economic growth. Furthermore conditional convergence shows no 
significant relationship with economic growth. 
In order to explore how changes of trust affect economic growth, I estimate the 
model using a panel analysis
26. The standard methods of panel estimation are fixed 
25Testing for heteroskedasticity which tests the assumption of constant error variance by examining 
whether squared standardized residuals are linearly related to ŷ (Hamilton 2006: 199) I get significant 
heteroskedasticity. My results suggest that in this instance I should reject the null hypothesis of 
constant variance. A residual-versus-predicted graph shows that especially the two cases China and 
Ireland are responsible for the presence of heteroskedasticity. I therefore use an OLS regression with 
robust estimators. This option allows me to calculate the standard errors in a way which does not 
imply homoskedasticity of the error term.
26For a detailed discussion of panel analysis see Frees 2004, Baltagi 2005, Greene: 283 ff., Stata Press 
2005b.
20effects or random effects. The fixed effects estimates are calculated from differences 
within each country;the random effects incorporate information  across individual
Table 3
OLS, Pooled Panel, Fixed-Effects, Random Effects
Estimation OLS Pooled Fixed effects Random effects
method Panel  
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4)
Interpersonal 0.069*** 0.05*** -0.08** 0.04**
Trust (3.75) (2.77) (-2.52) (2.15)
Income -1.21*** -0.69 -4.81*** -0.81
(-2.88) (-1.40) (-3.67) (-1.38)
Education 0.50 0.15 0.87*** 0.20
(0.74) (1.10) (3.49) (1.19)
PPP -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03***
(-2.76) (-3.30) (-3.36) (-3.00)
Constant 12.9** 8.3** 46.2*** 9.1**
(3.75) (2.25) (4.12) (2.09)
R-Squared 0.63 0.22 0.28 0.32
Countries 32 41 41 41
Observations 32 129 129 129
Period 90-04 80-04 80-04 80-04
* Significance at the 90 percent level (one-tailed test)
** Significance at the 95 percent level (one-tailed test)
*** Significance at the 99 percent level (one-tailed test)
Note : Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-ratios. R-Squared is the within-R-squared for 
fixed effects and the between-R-Squared for random effects.
countries as well as across periods. The major drawback with random effects is that 
it is consistent only if the country-specific effects are not correlated with the other 
explanatory variables. A Hausmann specification test can evaluate whether this 
independence assumption is satisfied (Hausman 1978, Forbes 2000: 874, Stata Press 
212005a: 441-448). My Hausmann test indicates that I should take a fixed-effects 
model
27.
Regressions 3 and 4 in Table 3 considers the case of linear regression with panel 
data. As there has been no research conducted on panel data I am aware of I found it 
most appropriate to start estimating my panel data with the method of linear 
regression. As there is the possibility of cross-sectional heteroskedasticity I am using 
a robust estimation technique. The coefficient are the same with and without the 
robust estimation technique, however the robust estimator produces larger standard 
errors.  My fixed-effects estimations use 41 cross-section observations with 129 
observations. Regression 3 in Table 3 contradicts the results of all previous 
empirical works (Kack and Keefer 1997, Zak and Knack 2001, La Porta and others 
1997, Beugelsdijk et al. 2004, cf. Heliwell 1996), as well as my own results from my 
cross-section design and my pooled panel analysis as I get a negative (–0.08) and 
significant (-2.52) coefficient for my interpersonal trust variable, which means that 
changes in trust and changes in economic growth are negatively related to each 
other. All other variables in my model have the expected signs. I find significant 
conditional   convergence,   a   positive   relationship   between   human   Capital   and 
economic growth and a significant negative coefficient for the variable price level of 
investment. 28 percent of the within-variance can be explained. Regression 4 
presents the random-effects model. As expected when taking a random-effects 
model I replicate my positive results from the cross-section and the pooled panel 
analysis. I get a positive (0.04) and significant result (Significant at the 90 percent 
level).
Sensitivity Analysis
Since the negative relationship between interpersonal trust and economic growth in 
Regression 3 in Table 3 challenges econometric work using a cross-section design 
the robustness of the results has to be tested. To test the sensitivity of my results 
Table 4 shows several specification tests including the exclusion of influential 
observations, the alteration of case specifications, the inclusion of additional 
regressors, the restructuring of the data and resampling techniques. The first row of 
27The test statistic is χ² (4) = 213.42. This rejects the null hypothesis at any standard of significance.
22Table   4    (labelled   none)   reports   the   results,   standard   errors   and   regression 
coefficient, taken from Regression 3 from Table 3. Succeeding rows report the 
effects of interpersonal trust on economic growth when the indicated change is 
made. The second row of Table 4 reports the results after dropping the case of 
Poland from my country sample. As can inferred from Figure 2 in Poland a decrease 
of interpersonal trust of 16,6 is associated with an increase of economic growth of 
5.2 percent. As suspected the case of Poland plays an important part in explaining 
the relationship between trust and economic growth. Although the relationship 
between trust and economic growth stays significant (significance at the 90 percent 
level) the coefficient decreases from -0.08 to -0.06. In the third row I drop the case 
of Greece. As can be inferred from Table 1 Greece level of trust decreases by 26,7 
percent. This decrease is associated with an increase of economic growth by 2,91 
percent. After deleting Greece from my country sample the relationship between 
changes in trust and changes in economic growth looses statistical significance. Row 
4-13  examine  the different country samples. When excluding the six transition 
countries
28  from my country sample I detect a curvilinear relationship. When 
examining an OECD country sample the relationship is negatively related to 
economic growth (which is strongly due to the case of Poland). In my OECD23 
country sample the relationship can either be linear modulated or curvilinear. In the 
linear modulation I get a significant negative result, however the curvilinear 
relationship explains 16 percent more of the variance in international growth rates. 
Similarly  to  my OECD23 country sample my EU15 country sample
29  can be 
modulated in both relationships either linear or curvilinear. In the linear modulation 
I get a significant negative coefficient (Which is strongly due to Finland and the 
United Kingdom), however the curvilinear model is able to explain 52 percent of the 
within variation (18 percent more than the linear model). Apart from Poland and 
28 Especially transition countries should follow a different path when considering economic growth 
rates over the time period studied. In 1989 the economy of the six transition countries that are 
included in the analysis Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia were 
characterized by a rapid decline in economic growth rates and vital increase in economic growth rates 
during the 1990`s.
29EU15 countries should be treated separately from OECD countries for several reasons. On the one 
hand the EU-15 countries are characterized by an integration in one single market allowing free trade, 
free movement of persons, service and capital. On the other hand the EU-15 countries are said to 
have a specific European social model (Giddens 2006a and 2006b, Kaelble 2004, Aust et al. 2000) 
contrasting them strongly to countries from the OECD. 
23Table 4 
Sensitivity Analysis- Fixed Effects Estimation
Specification Coefficient on    Standard   Countries Observations R-Square
Change Trust error Within
Influential Cases
None -0.08** (-2.52) 41 129 0.28
1 (Poland) -0.06* (-2.06) 40 126 0.27
2 (Poland+ -0.05 (-1.60) 39 124 0.27
Greece)
Country Samples
without transition 0.18** / -0.003*** (2.35 / -3.03) 35 115 0.45
OECD -0.08** (-2.45) 27 94 0.21
OECD23  -0.05* (-1.68) 23 83 0.32
OECD23 0.26*** / -0.004*** (3.05 / -3.76) 23 83 0.48
EU15 -0.08* (-1.91) 14 54 0.34
EU15 0.28*** / -0.004*** (2.31 / -3.13) 14 54 0.52 
Liberal -0.09*** (-3.58) 5 18 0.60
Scandinavian -0.21* (-2.17) 5 15 0.74
Developing 0.13* (1.99) 11 29 0.71
Latin America 0.27** (3.50) 5 13 0.96
Specifications
Open -0.05* (-1.68) 41 129 0.46
KI -0.08** (-2.59) 41 129 0.29
PopGro -0.07** (-2.48) 41 129 0.29
strust parliament -0.1*** (-2.64) 41 114 0.26
strust forces -0.1*** (-2.95) 41 114 0.26
strust police -0.11*** (-3.01) 41 114 0.27
strust company -0.04 (-1.35) 41 102 0.46
Social 
Expenditure -0.065** (-2.14) 27 84 0.32
Inequality -0.09** (-2.27) 20 62 0.42
Restructuring of data
3 Waves (unbalanced) -0.11** (-2.21) 41 96 0.28
3 Waves (balanced)  -0.09* (-1.81) 15 45 0.60
5 Waves (balanced) -0.08 (-1.30) 3 15 0.50
Methods
Clustering for -0.08*** (-2.62) 41 129 0.28
human capital
boot -0.08* (-1.91) 41 129 0.28
jack -0.08* (-1.86) 41 129 0.28
* Significance at the 90 percent level (one-tailed test)
** Significance at the 95 percent level (one-tailed test)
*** Significance at the 99 percent level (one-tailed test)
Note : Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-ratios. 
24Greece the negative relationship between trust and economic growth seems to be 
driven   by  the   highly   developed   countries   from   the  liberal   country   sample
30 
(Significance at the 99 percent level) and the Scandinavian
31 country sample. As 
already seen in Figure 3.5 in the United Kingdom and the United States a strong 
decrease in trust, is associated with an increase of economic growth. Row 11 
examines the developing country sample
32. An increase of  interpersonal trust is 
associated with an increase in economic growth. Countries from Latin America
33 
(Row13) face a positive relationship  between changes of trust and changes of 
economic growth. The theoretical claim that, considering developing countries, trust 
changes should have a positive effect on changes of economic growth is hereby 
verified.  Row 14 includes the variable Openness. The trust coefficient stays 
statistical significant. The model is now able to explain 46 percent of the within 
variation of economic growth (18 percent more than the original result from 
Regression 1 in Table 3.8). Openness seems to very important variable when trying 
to explain the within-variation of economic growth. Row 15 and 16 include the two 
Solow parameters   investment share of GDP and Population Growth. The trust 
coefficient remains statistical significant. Row 17-20 includes four indicators of 
systemic i) confidence in the parliament, ii) confidence in the forces, iii) confidence 
in the police, iv) confidence in big companies. All four systemic trust variables are 
not statistically significant related to economic growth. However strust company is 
related to interpersonal trust as interpersonal trust looses statical significance when 
strust company is included into the Regression. Furthermore when examining an 
OECD or EU15 country sample strust parliament and strust company are both 
negatively related to economic growth. Especially in Liberal market economies a 
decline in strust parliament is associated with an increase of economic growth 
(Significance at the 99 percent level). Row 21 includes social expenditure into the 
regression. The trust coefficient is not altered by the inclusion of social expenditure. 
The hypothesis which was elaborated in I (4) that social expenditure could explain 
the negative relationship between trust and economic growth has be to rejected 
30The liberal country sample includes the US, the UK, Ireland, Canada and Australia (for details see 
Hall and Soskice 2001).
31The Scandinavian country sample includes Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland.
32 I included the following countries: China, India, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, South 
Africa, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines.
33I included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela.
25(However the hypothesis was, due to data restrictions, only tested in 27 OECD 
countries with a total of 84 countries). Row 22 includes the Gini-Coefficient. The 
trust coefficient is not altered. The hypothesis which was elaborated in I (4) that 
social inequality could explain the negative relationship between trust and economic 
growth has to be rejected (However the hypothesis was, due to data restrictions, only 
tested in 20 OECD countries with a total of 62 observations). Row 23 examines an 
unbalanced panel for the time period 1990-2004. This procedure allows to exclude 
the data taken from the Eurobarometer 25. After excluding the first two periods 
(1980-1989) trust is still negatively and significantly related to economic growth. 
Row 24 considers a balanced panel with 15 countries and 45 country observations 
examining economic growth from 1990-2004 using data from the second, third and 
fourth wave of the WVS. Trust is negatively related to economic growth. When 
using a balanced panel from 1980-2004 (Row 25) taking 5 countries with 15 
observations into consideration trust looses statistical significance (which is mainly 
due to the small number of observations). Row 26 shows the result when clustering 
for my human capital variable (Clustering for the other variables doe not change my 
results). This procedure is introduced by Stata (Stata Press 2005b) and produces an 
estimator that is robust to cross-sectional hereroskedasticity and within-panel serial 
correlation which is asymptotically equivalent to that proposed by Arellano (1987) 
(293). Row 27 and 28 introduce resampling techniques. Either when using bootstrap 
estimation or jackknife estimation the coefficient remains statistical significant 
(However only at the 90 percent level).
VI. Conclusion
This paper has examined the relationship between trust and economic growth. 
Several findings are especially important. 
Firstly, taking panel data and using a fixed-effects estimation, in a 41 country 
sample over the time period from 1980-2004 with a total of 129 observations, the 
paper points out that economic growth is negatively related to an increase of trust. 
This negative finding is in contrast to most empirical findings using a cross-section 
26design. The negative relationship seems to be mainly driven by developed countries 
from the OECD, the EU15 and very strongly by Liberal Market Economies and 
Scandinavian countries. From an economic growth perspective, one could therefore 
argue that developed countries inherent too much trust. The Olson thesis seems to be 
correct that too much cooperation strangles economic growth. However, when 
considering a country sample, which excludes the six transition countries I detect a 
curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship. In countries with low levels of trust an 
increase of trust leads to an increase in economic growth (Developing country 
sample + Latin America country sample). In countries with high levels of trust an 
increase of interpersonal trust leads to a decrease of economic growth (especially 
Liberal Market Economies + Scandinavian country sample). 
Secondly, the differentiation between systemic trust and interpersonal trust, reveals 
that not only interpersonal trust is significantly negatively related to economic 
growth but also my variables, strust_parliament and strust_company. Taking an 
OECD country sample an increase of both variables is negatively related to 
economic growth.  
Thirdly,   interpersonal   trust   behaves   robust   towards   the   inclusion   of   social 
expenditure per GDP and income inequality in an fixed-effects estimations as  well 
as in a pooled panel design (However the relationship is only tested in an OECD23 
country sample). Differently to my theoretical elaboration social expenditure and 
income inequality seem not be responsible for the negative relationship between 
trust and economic growth. 
Although these results appear to be robust and in line with theoretical assumptions it 
is possible that the findings are partly due to omission of some variable not 
considered,   that   measurement   error   affect   the   results,   or   that   the   model   is 
misspecified in other ways. Further  investigations are necessary to corroborate the 
findings to be able to answer policy relevant questions.
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